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Current  knowledge  does  not  allow  the prediction  of  when  low  pathogenic  avian  inﬂuenza
virus  (LPAIV)  of  the  H5  and  H7  subtypes  infecting  poultry  will  mutate  to  their  highly
pathogenic  phenotype  (HPAIV).  This  mutation  may  already  take  place  in  the  ﬁrst infected
ﬂock;  hence  early  detection  of LPAIV  outbreaks  will  reduce  the likelihood  of  pathogeni-
city  mutations  and  large  epidemics.  The  objective  of  this  study  was  the  development  of  a
model for the design  and evaluation  of  serological-surveillance  programmes,  with  a partic-
ular focus  on early  detection  of  LPAIV  infections  in layer  chicken  ﬂocks.  Early  detection  is
deﬁned as the  detection  of an infected  ﬂock before  it infects  on average  more  than  one  other
ﬂock  (between-ﬂock  reproduction  ratio  Rf < 1), hence  a LPAI  introduction  will be  detected
when  only  one  or  a few  other  ﬂocks  are  infected.  We  used  a  mathematical  model  that inves-
tigates  the required  sample  size  and  sampling  frequency  for early  detection  by taking into
account the  LPAIV  within-  and  between-ﬂock  infection  dynamics  as  well  as the  diagnostic
performance  of  the  serological  test  used.  Since  layer  ﬂocks  are  the target  of  the  surveil-
lance,  we  also  explored  whether  the  use of eggs,  is  a good  alternative  to sera,  as sample
commodity.  The  model  was  used  to reﬁne  the  current  Dutch  serological-surveillance  pro-
gramme. LPAIV  transmission-risk  maps  were constructed  and  used  to target  a risk-based
surveillance  strategy.  In conclusion,  we  present  a model  that  can  be used  to explore  dif-
ferent  sampling  strategies,  which  combined  with  a cost-beneﬁt  analysis  would  enhance
surveillance  programmes  for low  pathogenic  avian  inﬂuenza.. IntroductionLow pathogenic avian inﬂuenza viruses (LPAIV) of the
5 and H7 subtypes can mutate to highly pathogenic avian
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inﬂuenza virus (HPAIV). Outbreaks caused by these LPAIV
are notiﬁable to the World Organisation for Animal Health
(OIE). Therefore, Member States (MS) of the European
Union (EU) have implemented surveillance programmes
(Gonzales et al., 2010), and in the event of detection of a
LPAIV, eradication measures are implemented (European
Council, 2005). Nevertheless, mutations from LPAI to HPAI
virus have occurred (DEFRA, 2008; San Miguel and Sanchez,
2010). This mutation can take place in the ﬁrst infected
ﬂock (Rojas et al., 2002; DEFRA, 2008; San Miguel and
Sanchez, 2010), but also after transmission of the LPAIV
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to several other ﬂocks (Eckroade and Silverman, 1986;
Capua and Maragon, 2000). Therefore, implementing active
surveillance targeting early detection of LPAIV outbreaks
will reduce the probability of virulence mutations and
subsequent animal health, welfare, and economic conse-
quences.
Current surveillance programmes for LPAI, in the EU,
are designed to serologically detect infected ﬂocks while
assuming a design prevalence (Gonzales et al., 2010). It is
expected that infection is present at a level equal or greater
than this intuitively chosen design prevalence (Cannon,
2002). The current design approach allows the estimation
of sample size, and the intuitive selection of the target
populations. However, because of both the assumption
that prevalence in an infected ﬂock will always exceed the
design prevalence and that the rate of virus introduction is
unknown, optimal sampling frequency is not obvious. Since
new introductions of LPAIV in poultry in the EU occur on
regular basis (Gonzales et al., 2010), sampling frequency is
an important variable in surveillance. Hence, a method that
could estimate the optimal sampling frequency would help
to improve current surveillance regulations.
The Dutch surveillance programme aims to detect
infections caused by H5 or H7 LPAIV subtypes and to com-
plement the demonstration of a ‘free of infection’ status.
This programme samples all poultry ﬂocks at least once
a year. It assumes that outdoor (free range) layer chicken
ﬂocks, have a high risk of virus introduction (Thomas et al.,
2005; Koch and Elbers, 2006). Therefore outdoor layers
ﬂocks have to be sampled 4 times per year (Elbers et al.,
2007a). Recently, it has been conﬁrmed that outdoor layer
ﬂocks have eleven times higher risk of introduction of
LPAIV than indoor layer ﬂocks (Gonzales et al., 2013). As a
result, possible changes in the surveillance regulations such
as increasing sampling frequency and targeting early detec-
tion are being considered (Bijleveld, 2012). Hence, there is a
need to develop a method that quantitatively provides esti-
mates for sample size and sampling frequency to improve
the current programme.
The objective of this study was to develop a model for
the design and evaluation of surveillance programmes for
early detection of LPAI infections in layer chicken ﬂocks
and to use this model to derive the relations between
sample, test, sample size and sampling frequencies, which
sufﬁce the minimal control criteria – we established for
surveillance design – of a between-ﬂock reproduction ratio
(Rf) < 1. We  developed a model that takes into account the
within- and between-ﬂock infection dynamics and the per-
formance of the diagnostic test. As a result, the required
combination of sample size and sample frequency to ensure
early detection is obtained. We  explored the possibility of
implementing a programme using sera samples for surveil-
lance, or an alternative programme using egg samples.
2. Methods
2.1. Within ﬂock infection dynamicsThe within-ﬂock infection dynamics were ana-
lysed using a deterministic SIR (Susceptible–Infectious–
Recovered) model for a ﬂock with 20,000 chickensy Medicine 117 (2014) 251–259
(average size of a layer chicken farm in the Netherlands).
The differential equations describing the transition rates
in this model have been described elsewhere (Keeling
and Rohani, 2008). To account for the variation in the
within-ﬂock transmission characteristics of various
LPAIV strains, the model was parameterised using data
from various transmission experiments (van der Goot
et al., 2003; Gonzales et al., 2011, 2012a,b) and from
outbreaks (Gonzales et al., 2012b) (Table 1). With these
data, the dynamics of LPAIV of low and high transmission
characteristics were considered in the analysis (Table 1).
2.2. Infectiousness of a ﬂock and transmission to other
ﬂocks
How capable an infected ﬂock is to transmit infection
to other ﬂocks is deﬁned here as infectiousness and it is
denoted by A(t) (Diekmann and Heesterbeek, 2000). This
function is a measure of the infectiousness of an infected
ﬂock towards susceptible ﬂocks, and is given by:
A(t) =
∫ t
0
I(t)dt (1)
where I(t) is the prevalence of infectious animals at time
t. Hence, the expected overall infectiousness of the farms
is obtained from Eq. (1), by integrating over t ∈ [0,∞].
This overall infectiousness multiplied by a constant c
(Diekmann and Heesterbeek, 2000), which combines infor-
mation about the rate at which this infected farm connects
with susceptible farms and the probability of transmission,
deﬁnes the expected number of secondary infected ﬂocks,
induced by a primary infectious ﬂock during its entire infec-
tious period, in a susceptible environment. This expected
number is the between-ﬂock reproduction ratio Rf:
Rf = cA(∞)  (2)
Our basic principle is to detect an infected ﬂock before it
infects on average more than one other ﬂock. In that case,
a LPAI infection will be detected when only one or a few
other ﬂocks are infected.
We study a situation where the population is initially
free from infection and infection is introduced in a sin-
gle ﬂock. This means that any infectious ﬂock (ﬂocks), if
detected, is removed from the population.
2.3. Between ﬂock transmission
Transmission between ﬂocks is described by the
between-ﬂock reproduction ratio Rf. We  calculated Rf for
all layer ﬂocks in the Netherlands and used this estimates
to deﬁne the level of transmission risk at an area level.
The estimation of Rf was made according to Boender et al.
(2007a,b,c). We  ﬁrst calculated the probability of trans-
mission P(xi,j) from ﬂock i to j, a distance xij apart, using
P(xij) = 1 − exp[− h(xij)Ti], where Ti is the infectious period
of ﬂock i, and h(xi,j) is a transmission kernel (Boender et al.,
2007b). The latter describes how the transmission rate
scales with distance. We  examined different kernel func-
tions (Table 2), and, on the basis of the Akaike’s Information
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Table  1
Parameter values used in the model for the analysis of the within ﬂock infection dynamics of low pathogenic avian inﬂuenza viruses (LPAIV) of low and
high  transmission characteristics.
Parameters Ref
Infection dynamicsa  ˇ = 0.20 day−1, T = 5.2 days, R0 = 1.0 (van der Goot et al., 2003)
ˇ  = 0.19 day−1, T = 7.8 days, R0 = 1.5 (Gonzales et al., 2012a)
ˇ  = 0.49 day−1, T = 7.7 days, R0 = 3.8 (Gonzales et al., 2011)
ˇ  = 0.72 day−1, T = 7.7 days, R0 = 5.6 (Gonzales et al., 2012b)
Probability of sero-conversion 0.87 (Gonzales et al., Unpublished results)
Time  to serological detectionb Serum = 5 days, egg = 13 days (Gonzales et al., Unpublished results)
Sensitivity at time of serological detection Serum = 0.99; egg = 0.99 (Gonzales et al., Unpublished results)
Egg  production sero-converting birds 82% (Gonzales et al., 2012b)
a ˇ, transmission rate; T, infectious period; R0, basic reproduction ratio. Parameters of LPAIV of low transmission characteristics are those with R0 ≤ 1.5
and  LPAIV of high transmission characteristics are those with R0 > 1.5.
b The difference between this time and T is the value b (see material and methods) used in the correction of t when modelling the prevalence of
seroconverting chickens in sera or eggs.
Table 2
Maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters for the different transmission kernel models evaluated.
Transmission kernel h(r)a Reference h0  x0 AIC
h(r) = h0K0(x/x0) (van den Bosch et al., 1990) 0.002 1.500 115.9
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a h0, transmission rate at a very short distance; x0, scaling distance; k0,
riterion (AIC), selected the kernel function that is given by
van den Bosch et al., 1990):
(x) = h0K0
(
x
x0
)
(3)
In Eq. (3), h0 is the transmission rate at a very short
istance, K0 is the modiﬁed Bessel function, which is
ecreasing as a function of the distance and describes a
andom diffusive movement of pathogens settling down at
 constant rate, and x0 is the scaling distance.
Following a procedure previously described (Boender
t al., 2007b), we estimated the infectious period Ti of an
nfected ﬂock and the parameters h0 and x0 of the trans-
ission kernel h(x) using data from LPAIV introductions
outbreaks) into chicken layer ﬂocks from 2003 to June
011 in the Netherlands. A total of 27 outbreaks were
elected for analysis, based on sufﬁcient information about
ntibody and/or virus (PCR) prevalence, egg production
ata and tracing. This information was used to reconstruct
he within-ﬂock infection dynamic (Comin et al., 2011a;
onzales et al., 2012b) and the between-ﬂock transmission
vents in case of secondary spread. Twenty out of these
7 outbreaks were primary introductions; the remaining
even were secondary cases. Fifteen outbreaks (11 index
nd 4 secondary cases) were caused by LPAIV of H7 sub-
ype (de Wit  et al., 2004; Gonzales et al., 2012a,b), seven
utbreaks were caused by H5 LPAIV (all single introduc-
ions), three (1 index and 2 secondary cases) were caused
y an H6 LPAIV (Gonzales et al., 2013) and two (1 index, 1
econdary case) were caused by an H10 LPAIV.
To estimate Ti, we assumed that an infected farm
ecomes infectious when the prevalence of infectious
hickens is higher than 2.5% [derived in relation to the
ransmission parameter and the latent period expected
or HPAI infected farms (Boender et al., 2007b)]. We  used
he estimates of Ti and h(x) to calculate P(xij), which was
hen used to calculate both the critical reproduction ratio0.031 0.46 0.085 117.9
0.028 2.00 0.180 119.6
d Bessel function.
Rc (Boender et al., 2007c) and the expected between-ﬂock
reproduction ratio Rf of a ﬂock (Boender et al., 2007a):
Rf =
1
Rc
∑
j /= i
P(xij) (4)
By including 1/Rc in Eq. (4) we corrected for the effect of
local depletion of susceptible ﬂocks in the neighbourhood
of an infectious ﬂock (which could lead to self-limiting
outbreaks) in the estimation of Rf. Finally, we  produced
risk maps that identify areas that contain low (Rf < 1) to
high risk (Rf ≥ 1) ﬂocks for the spatial spread of LPAI in
the Netherlands. The estimated Rf forms the basis for the
application of a risk based surveillance approach.
2.4. Surveillance
Effective control of LPAIV outbreaks depends on the
effective detection and removal of infected ﬂocks. Conse-
quently, the risk of spread of infection to other ﬂocks will be
reduced. However, this probability of detection – or sensi-
tivity of surveillance at the ﬂock level is not perfect. Despite
regular testing (assuming there is on-going surveillance),
there is still a non-zero probability that an infected ﬂock
escapes detection. Hence, the risk of transmission to other
ﬂocks remains. Here, we focus on the probability of a ﬂock
escaping detection.
The probability of escaping detection Pesc can be
described by a Poisson distribution with the number of
positive detections = 0 (Graat et al., 2001). This probabil-
ity depends on: (1) the prevalence p(t) of infected chickens
that have sero-converted (developed antibodies against
LPAIV) at the time the ﬂock is sampled, (2) the sensitivity
s of the diagnostic test at the individual chicken level, (3)
the number n of chickens/eggs sampled per ﬂock, which in
case of using eggs needs to be corrected with the expected
egg production e in recovered chickens, and (4) the
eterinar254 J.L. Gonzales et al. / Preventive V
sampling interval (sampling frequency) .  This parameter
has a particular inﬂuence in the cumulative sensitivity of
surveillance in time, and refers to repeated sampling per-
formed on a ﬂock with a determined frequency. Hence, the
probability of a ﬂock escaping detection at time t with p(t)
is conditional on the probability of having escaped detec-
tion at an earlier sampling point (one time unit ago) with
probability pt−1 within the sampling interval :
Pesc() =
t=∏
t=0
exp
(
−p(t)sne

)
(5)
In this equation, the probability of escaping detec-
tion depends on the expected prevalence p(t)/ of
sero-converting chickens at time t. We  estimated p(t)/
following ideas of Graat et al. (2001) and de Koeijer (2003).
Brieﬂy, we assume that introduction of infection takes
place at a random (unknown) moment between two  adja-
cent sampling times (t = 0 and t = )  in days. Hence, the
expected prevalence of seroconverting chickens can be
calculated by averaging the prevalence of seroconverting
chickens at the moment of sampling p(t) over all possible
introduction moments .  In our model p(t) = ˛z(t), where
 ˛ is the probability that an infected chicken seroconverts
and z(t) is the prevalence of recovered chickens at time t.
To obtain z(t), we ﬁrst included a correction b (days)
in the time t, where b includes information about the
time from infection to seroconversion (when antibodies
are likely to be detected by a serological test) and the time
from detection (shipment of samples to the laboratory,
screening and conﬁrmation tests) to culling of an infected
ﬂock. The latter – for the Dutch programme – takes on
average less than two days. To be conservative, we  used
two days, thus b = time to seroconversion + 2 days. Then,
we obtained z(t) from the recovered compartment in the
simulated SIR (within-ﬂock) dynamics, where z(t) = T(t + b),
which accounts for the earlier (before recovery) serocon-
version, detection and culling when using serum samples,
and z(t) = T(t − b), which accounts for the delay in sero-
conversion, detection and culling when using egg samples
(Table 1).
Note that in this model we assume perfect speciﬁcity,
since any seropositive result, in the current Dutch pro-
gramme, is followed up with more tests until a deﬁnite
conﬁrmation is reached. All parameters values are listed in
Table 1.
2.5. Effect of surveillance on the reduction of ﬂock
infectiousness
Next, we determine the expected infectiousness of a
ﬂock that escapes detection and therefore remains a risk
for transmission to other susceptible ﬂocks. This infectious-
ness is described by a function As(t). The latter describes the
infectiousness of a ﬂock from the time of introduction of the
infection (t = 0) to the time of sampling. In other words, As(t)
is the complement of the expected amount of infectious-
ness removed as a consequence of detection and cullingy Medicine 117 (2014) 251–259
of an infected ﬂock. We  model As(t) as a function of the
fraction of infectious chickens escaping detection at time t:
As(t) =
∫ t
0
I()Pescd (6)
The expected infectiousness of a ﬂock that escaped
detection is obtained from Eq. (6) by integrating over
t ∈ [0,∞].  It can be expected that a reduction in the ﬂock’s
infectiousness would result in a proportional reduction in
the between-ﬂock transmission Rf, which will be denoted
by Rs:
Rs = cAs(∞) (7)
Combining Eqs. (2) and (7) we obtain:
Rs = As(∞)
A(∞) Rf (8)
This formula is used to design a surveillance programme
for early detection of LPAI infections. Whenever Rs is equal
to or less than 1, outbreaks will be detected before they are
expected to spread to more than 1 other ﬂock. Thus, under
such a surveillance requirement we  do not expect a large
epidemic, due to sufﬁcient detection and culling.
2.6. Size of an epidemic given surveillance
To evaluate the effectiveness of a chosen surveillance
programme, the expected number of infected ﬂocks If()
at the time of detection, given the programme’s sampling
interval ,  needs to be determined. Following an analyt-
ical derivation by de Koeijer (2003), which assumes that
the time of introduction of infection t = 0 is uniformly dis-
tributed within ,  If()  can be estimated as:
If ()  =
I0
r
exp(r)[1 − exp(1 − r)] (9)
where, I0 is the number of infected ﬂocks at the start of the
epidemic, in this case we  assume(I0 = 1), r is the exponential
growth rate of the epidemic (between ﬂocks), and is given
by r = ˇf −  f. In the latter formula, ˇf is the between ﬂock
transmission rate and  f is the ﬂock recovery rate (1/T).
Note that the estimation of If() is conditional on intro-
duction and detection of a LPAI infected ﬂock within a time
period .
3. Results
3.1. Within-ﬂock transmission
The within-ﬂock transmission dynamics of LPAIV with
low transmission characteristics (R0 = 1.5) and LPAIV with
high transmission characteristics (R0 = 3.8 and R0 = 5.6) are
shown in (Fig. 1). In case of outbreaks with LPAIV with low
transmission characteristics (Fig. 1a) the infectious output
A(t) would be lower than that expected in ﬂocks infected
with LPAIV with high transmission characteristics (Fig. 1b
and c). In the examples given in Fig. 1, the expected infec-
tious output A(∞) for the low transmitting virus would be
4.45, while for the high transmitting viruses, A(∞) would
be 7.5 and 7.7 respectively. It can also be seen that for
infections with low transmitting viruses, the sharp increase
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Fig. 1. Within-ﬂock infection dynamics. (a) Infection dynamics of an outbreak caused by a low pathogenic avian inﬂuenza virus (LPAIV) of low transmission
characteristics (R0 = 1.5), (b) infection dynamics of an outbreak caused by a LPAIV
of  an outbreak caused by a LPAIV of high transmission characteristics (R0 = 5.6). In
sera  and eggs (corrected for egg production) is presented.
Table 3
Distribution of layer chickens ﬂocks based on their expected risk of trans-
mission as measured by their between-ﬂock reproduction ratio Rf a.
Rf Number of ﬂocks
Layers indoor Layers outdoor Total
<0.5 483 (59.9%) 196 (65.5%) 679 (61.4%)
<1 151 (18.7%) 46 (14.4%) 197 (17.8%)
≤1.5 86 (10.7%) 35 (11.7%) 121 (10.9%)
≤2 76 (9.4%) 20 (6.7%) 96 (8.7%)
≤2.15 11 (1.4%) 2 (0.7%) 13 (1.2%)
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aximum value, respectively, of the estimated Rf ≥ 1.
n prevalence of seroconverting chickens p(t) for both in
era and eggs, occurs in the initial phase of the outbreak,
efore the prevalence of infectious chickens I(t) reaches its
eak (i.e. the peak of the epidemic) (Fig. 1a). The oppo-
ite behaviour is observed, if a ﬂock would be infected
ith a high transmitting LPAIV. In this scenario, particularly
ith the prevalence of seroconverting chickens in eggs, the
harp increase in this prevalence takes place close to or
uring the late phase of the outbreak (after the peak of the
pidemic) (Fig. 1b and c).
.2. Between-ﬂock transmission
The transmission kernel presented in formula (3) had
he best ﬁt in comparison with the other kernel func-
ions evaluated (Table 2). The estimated (95% conﬁdence
ntervals (CI)) values for the parameters h0 and r0 of this
ransmission kernel were 0.002 (0.001–0.007) day−1 and
.5 (0.9–2.8) km respectively.
The mean (95% CI) infectious period of a ﬂock was 46
37–53) days. Using the estimates of the transmission ker-
el and the infectious period, we estimated individual Rf for
ach ﬂock and generated a risk map  (Fig. 2). Table 3 sum-
arises the number of farms within a transmission riskategory based on the estimated Rf. Most ﬂocks (79.2%) in
he Netherlands are located in areas of low ﬂock density
nd are expected to have low risk of transmission (Rf < 1).
he remaining ﬂocks are located in areas with higher ﬂock of high transmission characteristics (R0 = 3.8) and (c) infection dynamics
 these ﬁgures the proportion (prevalence) of chickens sero-converting in
density and are expected to have high risk of transmission
(Rf > 1) (Table 3). All poultry ﬂocks (chicken layers, breed-
ers, broilers, turkeys, etc.) in the Netherlands were included
in this analysis.
3.3. Early detection of infected ﬂocks
Increased sample size or increased sampling frequency
reduces the probability Pesc of an infected farm to escape
detection and culling, and consequently the remaining
infectiousness As(t) towards other ﬂocks. Fig. 3 shows the
effect of sample size or sampling frequency on the reduc-
tion of the expected overall infectiousness As(∞) using
sera or egg samples. For example, when surveying a ﬂock
located in a high risk area for between-ﬂock transmission
(Rf = 2), if 30 blood samples are taken every 4 months,
the estimated As(∞) – in the event of an outbreak with
a LPAIV with high transmission characteristics (R0 = 3.8,
A(∞) = 7.5) would be 3.45 (Fig. 3a). Consequently the
expected Rs = 0.93, and early detection would be expected.
If eggs are used instead of sera, it would be neces-
sary to sample 60 eggs every month (Rs = 0.96) (Fig. 3d).
Tables 4 and 5 show the required sample size and samp-
ling frequency (for eggs and sera samples) for ﬂocks with
different transmission risks Rf. In these tables two scenar-
ios involving LPAIV of high transmission characteristics are
presented.
3.4. Number of infected ﬂocks at the time of detection
Based on the model outcomes given in Table 4, samp-
ling of sera has to be performed with a minimum frequency
(sampling interval )  of six (Rf ≤ 1.5), four (Rf ≤ 12) and
three (Rf ≤ 2.15) months to keep Rs ≤ 1. These sampling
intervals are longer than the duration of a within-ﬂock
outbreak caused by a virus with high transmission char-
acteristics (Fig. 1), thus there is a probability that an
epidemic will not be detected in the ﬁrst infected ﬂock.
We evaluated the suitability of these intervals for early
detection by estimating the expected number of infected
ﬂocks If()  given this surveillance system. To perform this
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 betwee
igh risk
on (Rf <Fig. 2. Risk map  for transmission of low pathogenic avian inﬂuenza virus
by  the between-ﬂock reproduction ratio Rf . Flocks located in areas with h
and  2), while ﬂocks located in areas with the low risk of spreading infecti
estimation, we used the above mentioned estimates of the
mean infectious period of a ﬂock T = 46 days (1.53 months).
Thus  f = 1/T  = 0.65 month−1 and ˇf = Rf/T. By substituting
these values in Eq. (9), If(), and evaluating this for an
area where Rf ≤ 1.5 and  = 6 months, the expected num-
ber of infected ﬂocks in the epidemic equals 3. Estimates
of If()  for other risk areas and sampling frequencies are
given in Table 4 for a programme based on sampling sera
and Table 5 for a programme based on sampling eggs. Only
sample sizes that were multiples of 30 eggs were evalu-
ated, because that is the maximum size of an egg tray. This
may  simplify sampling and automated testing.
4. Discussion
In this study, we describe a model to design serological
surveillance programmes focussed on the early detection of
LPAI infections in layer chicken ﬂocks. This model allows for
a dynamic evaluation of the increasing seroprevalence dur-
ing the outbreaks and the accumulated number of infectedn poultry ﬂocks in The Netherlands. Risk of transmission is characterised
 of spreading infection are those in red (Rf > 2) and yellow (Rf between 1
 1) are those in blue and white.
ﬂocks during an epidemic (if the ﬁrst infected ﬂock is not
detected). It has the additional advantage that it can also
evaluate an effective sampling frequency, which is lacking
in conventional methods of surveillance design (Cannon,
2002; European Commission, 2007). This model also allows
for a risk based approach, where sampling is targeted at
the variable transmission potential of infected ﬂocks; i.e.
ﬂocks located in areas with higher risk of spreading infec-
tion (Rf ≥ 1) should be sampled with higher frequency than
ﬂocks with expected lower risk of transmission (Rf < 1).
Outbreaks affecting ﬂocks with Rf < 1 can be expected to die
out quickly, within the ﬁrst few infected ﬂocks (Diekmann
and Heesterbeek, 2000). An example of the latter is the
LPAIV H7N3 outbreak in 2003 in the Netherlands (de Wit
et al., 2004). Despite its high transmission characteristics
(Gonzales et al., 2012b), this virus affected only three ﬂocks,
which were located in an area of low ﬂock density (Rf < 1).
Here we assumed that virus introduction takes place at a
random moment between two  sampling events. Although
it was beyond the scope of this study, the model could
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Fig. 3. Expected reduction in the infectiousness of a ﬂock As(t) as a result of sample size and sample frequency. The following surveillance scenarios are
shown:  (a) 30 sera samples are taken every four months, (b) 30 sera samples taken every two months, (c) 60 egg samples every four months and (d) 60
eggs  samples taken every month.
Table 4
Number of sera samples n and sampling interval  (in months) required to reduce the expected between-ﬂock reproduction ratio Rf below 1a.
Rf b R0 = 3.8c R0 = 5.6d
n  Samplings per year Is()e n  Samplings per year Is()
<1f 30 12 1 ndg 30 12 1 nd
≤1.5 30  6 2 3 30 6 2 3
15  4 3 2 15 4 3 2
10  2 6 1 10 2 6 1
≤2 30  4 3 5 30 3 4 3
15  2 6 2 15 1.5 8 2
10  1 12 1 10 1 12 1
≤2.15 30  3 4 4 30 3 4 4
30  2 6 2 30 2 6 2
10  1 12 1 10 1 12 1
a Since the transmission characteristics of any new introduction of a low pathogenic avian inﬂuenza virus (LPAIV) are unknown, results are based on
LPAIV  of high transmission characteristics, which would represent a worst case scenario. Sample size and frequency to control introductions of LPAIV of
low  transmission characteristics would be lower (not shown).
b The intervals 1.5, 2, and 2.15 represent the median, 0.95 quantile and maximum value, respectively, of the estimated Rf ≥ 1 of layer ﬂocks in the
Netherlands (Table 3).
c Within ﬂock transmission was  simulated using parameters estimated for the LPAIV H7N1 (Gonzales et al., 2011).
d Within ﬂock transmission was  simulated using parameters estimated for the LPAIV H7N3 (Gonzales et al., 2012b).
e Is() is the expected number of infected ﬂock within the sampling interval ,  conditional on the introduction of LPAIV into a ﬂock with the potential
of  causing a large epidemic.
f Flocks located in areas with an expected Rf < 1 could be sampled with the aim of substantiating absence of infection rather than early detection.
g nd: not done.
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Table 5
Number of egg samples n and sampling interval  (in months) required to reduce the expected between-ﬂock reproduction ratio Rf below 1a.
Rf b R0 = 3.8c R0 = 5.6d
n  Samplings per year Is()e n  Samplings per year Is()
<1f 30 12 1 ndg 30 12 1 nd
≤1.5 60  3 4 2 120 3 4 2
30  1 12 1 90 2 6 1
≤2 120  2 6 2 150 1 12 1
60  1 12 1 90 0.5 24 1
≤2.15 150  2 6 2 120 0.5 24 1
90  1 12 1 60 0.23 52 1
a Since the transmission characteristics of any new introduction of a low pathogenic avian inﬂuenza virus (LPAIV) are unknown, results are based on
LPAIV  of high transmission characteristics, which would represent a worst case scenario. Sample size and frequency to control introductions of LPAIV of
low  transmission characteristics are lower (not shown).
b The intervals 1.5, 2, and 2.15 represent the median, 0.95 quantile and maximum value, respectively, of the estimated Rf ≥ 1 of layer ﬂocks in the
Netherlands (Table 3).
c Within ﬂock transmission was simulated using parameters estimated for the LPAIV H7N1 (Gonzales et al., 2011).
d Within ﬂock transmission was simulated using parameters estimated for the LPAIV H7N3 (Gonzales et al., 2012b).
e Is()  is the expected number of infected ﬂock within the sampling interval ,  conditional on the introduction of LPAIV into a ﬂock with the potential
 the aim
of  causing a large epidemic.
f Flocks located in areas with an expected Rf < 1 could be sampled with
g nd: not done.
be extended by including the rate of virus introduction.
While there appeared to be no evidence of geographical
differences in the risk of introduction of LPAIV within the
Netherlands (based on spatial cluster analysis), there are
signiﬁcant differences in the risk of introduction of LPAIV
into ﬂocks of different PT (Gonzales et al., 2013). Outdoor
layer ﬂocks have eleven times a greater risk of introduc-
tion of a LPAIV than indoor layer ﬂocks (Gonzales et al.,
2013). Including this risk difference in the model might
make surveillance more cost effective.
In addition to serological surveillance, passive surveil-
lance may  aid early detection, particularly in ﬂocks
sampled with low frequency. Field indicators such as a drop
in egg production and increased mortality, which are used
in the Dutch early warning system (EWS) (Elbers et al.,
2007b), helped detection of some LPAI outbreaks in layer
chicken ﬂocks (OIE). However, EWS  appears to have a low
sensitivity (Comin et al., 2011b), which may  possibly be due
to underreporting. Therefore, to improve the probability of
detection in ﬂocks tested with low frequency, a high level
of disease awareness needs to be maintained among farm-
ers, e.g. by keeping them informed about the disease and
its risk.
We found that sampling of eggs instead of sera can
be effective in surveillance for LPAI, although it requires
higher sample size (per ﬂock) and sampling frequency than
surveillance based on sera samples. This is because, during
the initial phase of an outbreak, egg sampling temporarily
leads to a lower probability of detection, which is a con-
sequence of a delay in the detection of antibodies in eggs
(Gonzales et al., Unpublished results) and of the decrease
in egg production in infected chickens (Gonzales et al.,
2012a,b).
Egg sampling based surveillance holds several advan-
tages over those that are serum based. Besides improving
welfare, egg sampling based surveillance is easier to imple-
ment and is eleven times less costly with respect to
logistic considerations (Rutten et al., 2012). However, the of substantiating absence of infection rather than early detection.
laboratory cost for diagnosis appear to be slightly (1.5
times) higher than testing of sera (Rutten et al., 2012). Thus
the reduction in cost of egg sampling might be weighted
with increased number of samples tested. To select the
most efﬁcient programme, a cost-beneﬁt analysis, balanced
with possible other arguments e.g. welfare, could guide
selection to an optimal solution.
The estimates of sample size and frequency using this
model are sensitive to the applied Rf. We estimated this
parameter using a transmission kernel, which does not
incorporate any distinction of the individual mechanism
leading to transmission between ﬂocks. Consequently, the
two  parameter kernel used in this study is a simpliﬁed rep-
resentation of the between-ﬂock contact structure. Our  Rf
estimates are applicable to the Dutch layer chicken indus-
try. The estimated Rf in areas with high ﬂock density in the
Netherlands are in accordance with the Rf estimates using
data of LPAI outbreaks in areas with high ﬂock densities in
Italy (Mulatti et al., 2010). In addition, our estimates are
further supported by the fact that no large LPAI epidemic
in poultry has been observed in the Netherlands in the past
10 years. The latter could be related to the expected Rf < 1
for most (79%) layer chicken ﬂocks in the country.
Extrapolation of these results to different situations
should be done with care, since our results are partially
based on speciﬁc conditions. The within ﬂock transmission
model assumes homogeneous mixing, and it is thus best
suited to commercial ﬂocks with a litter system. We also
considered one ﬂock equal to one farm. In case of farms
with more than one ﬂock, sampling should be increased
accordingly.
Finally, early detection and subsequent control of H5
or H7 LPAIV subtypes by culling, aims at removing these
LPAIV from the population before they mutate to a highly
pathogenic form or become a threat for public health (e.g.
H7N9 in China). Thus surveillance costs should be consid-
ered with respect to the potential for HPAI epidemics and
associated risks to public health. The surveillance model
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